Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers

DOI10.1007/s00712-014-0405-5zbMath1402.91168OpenAlexW2054749973MaRDI QIDQ1651026

Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni, Vincenzo Valori

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0405-5

zbMATH Keywords

information revelationasymmetric auctionsmultidimensional auctionsprocurement policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities ⋮ Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions

Cites Work

• A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
• Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
• Biased procurement auctions
• Logconcavity versus logconvexity: A complete characterization
• Emerging multiple issue e-auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric Auctions

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