Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2066677
DOI10.1007/s00712-021-00746-8zbMath1480.91114MaRDI QIDQ2066677
Shuang Xu, Yong Zhao, Yeming Gong
Publication date: 14 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00746-8
sequential auctions; information disclosure; multi-unit demand; expected revenue; single-unit demand
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
- Private monitoring in auctions
- Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
- He who must not be named
- Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
- The declining price anomaly
- Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
- Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions