Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:776848
DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00710-8zbMATH Open1444.91101OpenAlexW2611498503MaRDI QIDQ776848FDOQ776848
Authors: Helmuts Āzacis 
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8
Recommendations
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- Optimal auctions and information disclosure
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
- Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
- Study of bids' ordinal ranks information disclosure in sequential auctions
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
- Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- He who must not be named
This page was built for publication: Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q776848)
