Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00710-8MaRDI QIDQ776848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date 13 July 2020

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyinformation disclosureseller's revenuesequential first-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Sequential information disclosure in auctions
• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
• Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects

Cites work

• A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
• An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
• He who must not be named
• Manipulative auction design
• Reputational bidding
• Signal jamming in a sequential auction

Cited in

(11)

• Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• An Experimental Study of Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions
• Study of bids' ordinal ranks information disclosure in sequential auctions
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
• Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
• Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
• Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
• Sequential information disclosure in auctions
• He who must not be named

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