Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction
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Publication:2036987
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109895zbMath1467.91052OpenAlexW3159569451MaRDI QIDQ2036987
Publication date: 30 June 2021
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109895
Cites Work
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction