Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
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Publication:1003094
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4zbMath1155.91359OpenAlexW2009251648MaRDI QIDQ1003094
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items
Mid-auction information acquisition ⋮ Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Information revelation in competitive markets ⋮ Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets ⋮ Revealing information in auctions: the optimal auction versus the second-price auction ⋮ Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty ⋮ Information Disclosure and Pricing Policies for Sales of Network Goods ⋮ Efficient dark markets
Cites Work
- Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
- Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
