Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty

DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0283-7zbMATH Open1294.91103OpenAlexW2018423495MaRDI QIDQ741580FDOQ741580

Authors: Agostino Manduchi 

Publication date: 12 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-18345

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zbMATH Keywords

mutual informationBayesian learninginformation provisionmatch-value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Mathematical Theory of Communication
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• Another look at the Radner--Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
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• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The optimal private information in single unit monopoly
• A normalized value for information purchases

Cited In (1)

• Managing a supply chain under the impact of customer reviews: a two-period game analysis

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