Auctions with costly information acquisition
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Publication:1003100
DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0301-0zbMath1155.91363OpenAlexW2126754427MaRDI QIDQ1003100
George Jacques Crémer, Charles Z. Zheng, Yossef Spiegel
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2385/1/auctions_screen.pdf
Related Items (18)
The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Second-price auctions with private entry costs ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment ⋮ Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces ⋮ Information acquisition during a descending auction ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering
Cites Work
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- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Auctions with endogenous entry
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