Auctions with costly information acquisition
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Publication:1003100
DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0301-0zbMATH Open1155.91363OpenAlexW2126754427MaRDI QIDQ1003100FDOQ1003100
Authors: George Jacques Crémer, Charles Z. Zheng, Yossi Spiegel 
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2385/1/auctions_screen.pdf
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Cites Work
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Optimal search auctions
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Auctions with endogenous entry
- Search mechanisms
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Parallel search for the best alternative
- Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
Cited In (47)
- Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
- Information elicitation for Bayesian auctions
- Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
- Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
- Mechanisms with costly knowledge
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Inference from Auction Prices
- Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty
- Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs
- Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
- Second-price auctions with private entry costs
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
- Credible auctions: a trilemma
- Auctions with flexible information acquisition
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information
- A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
- Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Prices versus auctions in large markets
- Auction and the informed seller problem
- Introduction to the symposium
- Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
- Optimal search auctions
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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