Auctions with costly information acquisition
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Publication:1003100
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0301-0zbMath1155.91363MaRDI QIDQ1003100
George Jacques Crémer, Charles Z. Zheng, Yossef Spiegel
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2385/1/auctions_screen.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Introduction to the symposium, Second-price auctions with private entry costs, Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed, Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert, Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation, Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment, Information acquisition and full surplus extraction, The value of information for auctioneers, Prices versus auctions in large markets, Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation, Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study, Endogenous information and stochastic contracts, Pessimistic information gathering, Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning, Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition, Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions, Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces, Information acquisition during a descending auction
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