The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0847-6zbMATH Open1319.91084OpenAlexW2009499313MaRDI QIDQ476152FDOQ476152

Authors Stefano Barbieri, David A. Malueg, Iryna Topolyan

Publication date 28 November 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0847-6

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionfree-ridingprivate provision of public goodsgroup contestgroup-size paradoxvolunteer's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484308 (Why is no real title available?)
• A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relationship between group size and helping
• All-Pay Contests
• Auctions with interdependent valuations
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Extremism drives out moderation
• Group contest success functions
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
• Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

Cited in

(19)

• Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest
• Sharing the effort costs in group contests
• Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
• The role of noise variance on effort in group contests
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
• Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction
• Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
• A simple model of competition between teams
• Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests
• Simple equilibria in general contests
• Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
• Is there free riding in group contests?
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
• Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize
• An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities

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