The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0847-6MaRDI QIDQ476152zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefano Barbieri, David A. Malueg, Iryna Topolyan

Publication date 28 November 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0847-6

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionfree-ridingprivate provision of public goodsgroup contestgroup-size paradoxvolunteer's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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• Auctions with costly information acquisition

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484308 (Why is no real title available?)
• A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relationship between group size and helping
• All-Pay Contests
• Auctions with interdependent valuations
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Extremism drives out moderation
• Group contest success functions
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
• Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

Cited in

(19)

• Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest
• Sharing the effort costs in group contests
• Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
• The role of noise variance on effort in group contests
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
• Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction
• Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
• A simple model of competition between teams
• Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests
• Simple equilibria in general contests
• Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
• Is there free riding in group contests?
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
• Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize
• An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities

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