Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0283-YMaRDI QIDQ943345zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefano Barbieri, David A. Malueg

Publication date 9 September 2008

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0283-y

zbMATH Keywords

discrete public goodcontribution gameinterim incentive efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
• Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs
• Profit-maximizing sale of a discrete public good via the subscription game in private-information environments
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
• The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
• Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games.
• On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria

Cites work

• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information

Cited in

(21)

• Continuous-time public good contribution under uncertainty: a stochastic control approach
• Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Contributing with private bundles to public goods
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?
• Profit-maximizing sale of a discrete public good via the subscription game in private-information environments
• Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
• Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
• Private provision of discrete public goods: the correlated cost case
• Public disclosure and private information acquisition: a global game approach
• Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal
• The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
• Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
• Finite horizon game for voluntary provision of a discrete public good
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
• A private contributions game for joint replenishment
• Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information

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