Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00103-0zbMath1054.91017OpenAlexW2057707330MaRDI QIDQ1414620

Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 4 December 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00103-0

zbMATH Keywords

GradualismSunk contributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50)

Related Items (7)

Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring ⋮ Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game ⋮ Bargaining with history-dependent preferences ⋮ Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion ⋮ Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent ⋮ A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold ⋮ Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Cites Work

• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Gradualism and Irreversibility

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