A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.104997zbMath1432.91032OpenAlexW2999592521WikidataQ126353410 ScholiaQ126353410MaRDI QIDQ2295833

Yi Chen

Publication date: 17 February 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.104997

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumexperimentationfree-ridinginformation externalityrevision game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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Cites Work

• Duplicative search
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