Gradualism and Irreversibility

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00208zbMATH Open1035.91013OpenAlexW3121893222MaRDI QIDQ4789808FDOQ4789808

Authors: Ben Lockwood, J. P. Thomas 

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00208

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4110511
• Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game
• A folk theorem for dynamic games
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847259

zbMATH Keywords

multistage gamedynamic gamesymmetric equilibriumtwo-player gameasymmetric equilibriumpartial cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25) Discrete-time games (91A50)

Cited In (25)

• Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon
• Search without looking
• Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Teamwise mean field competitions
• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
• Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
• Revision games
• Duplicative search
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
• Shipwrecks and treasure hunters
• A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold
• Technology transfers for climate change
• Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring
• A model of gradual information disclosure
• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• Bilateral commitment
• Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
• Game of variable contributions to the common good under uncertainty
• Dynamics and coalitions in sequential games
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
• Holdup and innovation

This page was built for publication: Gradualism and Irreversibility

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4789808)