Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01252-6zbMath1479.91031OpenAlexW3009070239MaRDI QIDQ2061094

Chantal Marlats

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01252-6

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamesirreversibilityreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Reputation in dynamic games
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Irreversibility and the economics of forest conservation
• Irreversible investment in alternative projects
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• The Evolution of Conventions

This page was built for publication: Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players