Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players

DOI10.2307/2171882zbMATH Open0898.90142OpenAlexW2018173322MaRDI QIDQ4359768FDOQ4359768

Authors:

Publication date: 20 October 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171882

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zbMATH Keywords

reputationincomplete informationrepeated gamecommitment strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (16)

• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• The emergence of cooperation through leadership
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Commitment in first-price auctions
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• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
• Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
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• Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
• Reputation in long-run relationships
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

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