Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:645669
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.009zbMATH Open1274.91240OpenAlexW2152792369MaRDI QIDQ645669FDOQ645669
Authors: Alexander Wolitzky 
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.009
Recommendations
- Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
- Reputation in perturbed repeated games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
- Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
- Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Bayesian repeated games and reputation
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- Cooperation and Punishment
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
- On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
- Gambling reputation: repeated bargaining with outside options
- Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
- Reputation in perturbed repeated games
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q645669)
