Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.009MaRDI QIDQ645669zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrepeated gamesreputationcontractsequilibrium selectionlong-run players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
• Cooperation and Punishment
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Gambling reputation: repeated bargaining with outside options
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
• Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality

Cited in

(2)

• Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
• Covenants and reputations

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