Covenants and reputations

DOI10.1007/S11229-006-9147-4MaRDI QIDQ2460165zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Vanderschraaf

Publication date 14 November 2007

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9147-4

zbMATH Keywords

Covenant gameFolk theoremHobbesHumeoffensive violationsimulationtrigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Review text

Consider an infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma with opting out, played by a fixed, finite set of players under random matching. The paper finds the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs for this game. The paper then interprets the results in light of classical British political philosophy (Hobbes, Hume). A series of 1000-period simulations illustrate the results.

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Cites work

• Agreeing to disagree
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Errors of judgment and reporting in a law merchant system
• Simulating Society
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Some experimental games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(3)

• Sort out your neighbourhood. Public good games on dynamic networks
• David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning
• Locke's state of nature and its epistemic deficit: a game-theoretic analysis

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