Covenants and reputations

DOI10.1007/S11229-006-9147-4zbMATH Open1221.91010OpenAlexW2104293044MaRDI QIDQ2460165FDOQ2460165

Peter Vanderschraaf

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9147-4

Recommendations

• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900
• Reputation and the evolution of conflict
• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts

zbMATH Keywords

simulationtrigger strategyFolk theoremHumeHobbesCovenant gameoffensive violation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Agreeing to disagree
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Some experimental games
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Simulating Society
• Errors of judgment and reporting in a law merchant system

Cited In (2)

• Sort out your neighbourhood. Public good games on dynamic networks
• David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning

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