Covenants and reputations

DOI10.1007/S11229-006-9147-4MaRDI QIDQ2460165zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Vanderschraaf

Publication date 14 November 2007

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9147-4

zbMATH Keywords

simulationtrigger strategyFolk theoremHumeHobbesCovenant gameoffensive violation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900
• Reputation and the evolution of conflict
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Cites work

• Agreeing to disagree
• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Errors of judgment and reporting in a law merchant system
• Simulating Society
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Some experimental games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(2)

• Sort out your neighbourhood. Public good games on dynamic networks
• David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning

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