Covenants and reputations (Q2460165)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5211695
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| English | Covenants and reputations |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5211695 |
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Covenants and reputations (English)
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14 November 2007
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Consider an infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma with opting out, played by a fixed, finite set of players under random matching. The paper finds the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs for this game. The paper then interprets the results in light of classical British political philosophy (Hobbes, Hume). A series of 1000-period simulations illustrate the results.
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Covenant game
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Folk theorem
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Hobbes
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Hume
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offensive violation
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simulation
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trigger strategy
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0.7139174938201904
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0.6970669031143188
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0.6946873664855957
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0.6946873664855957
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