A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
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Cited in
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- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
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- Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Information asymmetry and reentry
- Covenants and reputations
- A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
- Corrigendum to ``Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
- Reputation in continuous-time games
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning
- A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
- Reputation with analogical reasoning
- Reputation effects
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
- Learning in network contexts: experimental results from simulations
- Marginal reputation
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
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