RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
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Cites work
- A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
- A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
- A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
- Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
- Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
- Common Priors: A Reply to Gul
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
- On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation in repeated games with no discounting
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
Cited in
(15)- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
- Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
- Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
- Payoff information and learning in signaling games
- Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
- Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Signaling games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5583180 (Why is no real title available?)
- Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
- Order independence for rationalizability
- The epistemic spirit of divinity
- Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness
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