Reputation in repeated games with no discounting

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0060MaRDI QIDQ1816397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joel Watson

Publication date 26 November 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0060

zbMATH Keywords

two-player, infinitely repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Cited in

(14)

• Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation games for undirected graphs
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation

This page was built for publication: Reputation in repeated games with no discounting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1816397)