Reputation in repeated games with no discounting

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0060zbMATH Open0860.90143OpenAlexW1988884331MaRDI QIDQ1816397FDOQ1816397

Authors: Joel Watson 

Publication date: 26 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0060

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zbMATH Keywords

two-player, infinitely repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (12)

• Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
• Bayesian repeated games and reputation
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation games for undirected graphs
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
• A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

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