Order independence for rationalizability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.11.013MaRDI QIDQ6148581zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julien Manili

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.013

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryiterated elimination procedureorder independencerationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
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• Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities
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• Common belief foundations of global games
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Iterated elimination procedures
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
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• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• On theories with a combinatorial definition of 'equivalence'
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Pure Strategy Dominance
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
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• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability
• The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
• Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
• Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem

Cited in

(1)

• Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games

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