Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00360MaRDI QIDQ5475015zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Dufwenberg, Mark Stegeman

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00360

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(35)

• Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property.
• On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
• Iterated dominance revisited
• Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games
• Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
• Reasonable Nash demand games
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• Iterated elimination procedures
• Dominance rationality: a unified approach
• Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces
• Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Coalitional strategic games
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
• Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
• On the maximal reduction of games
• Rationality in qualitative games
• The context of the game
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
• Iterated bounded dominance
• Order independence for rationalizability
• Unique stable matchings
• Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
• The reasoning-based expected utility procedure
• A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
• The hierarchical construction of a universal qualitative belief space
• Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited
• On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
• Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games

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