Unique stable matchings
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Abstract: In this paper we show that a one-to-one two-sided matching market possesses a unique stable matching if and only if preferences on the normal form (Irving and Leather, 1986; Balinski and Ratier, 1997) are acyclic (Chung, 2000) if and only if the normal form is precisely the unique stable matching and nothing more.
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Cited in
(9)- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
- A note on the uniqueness of stable marriage matching
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7359421 (Why is no real title available?)
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