A Theory of N -Person Games with Perfect Information

DOI10.1073/PNAS.39.6.496MaRDI QIDQ5817850zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors David Gale

Publication date 1953

Published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.6.496

zbMATH Keywords

probability theory

Cited in

(20)

• Non-cooperative stochastic dominance games
• Decision-making by an authority under influence
• A three-person deterministic graphical game without Nash equilibria
• Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
• Combinatorial games modeling seki in Go
• Bipartite choices
• Determinacy and indeterminacy of games played on complete metric spaces
• On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games
• Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies
• Playing in the first Baire class
• Iterative information update and stability of strategies
• On the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in two person discrete games
• Unverschr�nkte Graphen und strategische Spiele in kombinatorischer Form
• Computing lexicographically safe Nash equilibria in finite two-person games with tight game forms given by oracles
• Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
• Unique stable matchings
• Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms
• On Nash-solvability of n-person graphical games under Markov and a-priori realizations
• On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non- cooperative games
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology

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