On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games
DOI10.1016/j.disc.2011.11.011zbMath1235.91009OpenAlexW2013992407WikidataQ59560521 ScholiaQ59560521MaRDI QIDQ409428
Endre Boros, Kazuhisa Makino, Vladimir A. Gurvich, Khaled M. Elbassioni
Publication date: 13 April 2012
Published in: Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disc.2011.11.011
moveNash equilibriumpositionperfect informationstochastic gamebest replychess- and backgammon-like gamesimprovement cyclerandom movesubgame perfect
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Combinatorial games (91A46)
Related Items (9)
Cites Work
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