A semi-potential for finite and infinite games in extensive form

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00301-7zbMATH Open1434.91011arXiv1309.2798OpenAlexW2937118551MaRDI QIDQ2175356FDOQ2175356

Arno Pauly, Stéphane Le Roux

Publication date: 29 April 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction of better-response dynamics will converge to a Nash equilibrium in quadratic (finite) time. Convergence happens on a per-player basis, and even in the presence of players with cyclic preferences, the players with acyclic preferences will stabilize. Thus, we obtain a candidate notion for rationality in the presence of irrational agents. Moreover, the restriction of convertibility can be justified by a conservative updating of beliefs about the other players strategies. For infinite games in extensive form we can retain convergence to a Nash equilibrium (in some sense), if the preferences are given by continuous payoff functions; or obtain a transfinite convergence if the outcome sets of the game are $Delt{a}_2^0$-sets.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.2798

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zbMATH Keywords

convergenceinfinite gamesbelief learningsequential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited In (3)

• On potential equations of finite games
• Semivalues of Political Economic Games
• Well-founded extensive games with perfect information

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