On the termination of dynamics in sequential games

DOI10.1016/J.IC.2019.104505zbMATH Open1443.91045OpenAlexW2909456615WikidataQ126561718 ScholiaQ126561718MaRDI QIDQ2182736FDOQ2182736

Authors: Thomas Brihaye, G. Geeraerts, Marion Hallet, Stéphane Le Roux 

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2019.104505

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zbMATH Keywords

extensive form gamessequential games\(n\)-player non-zero sum gameslazy improvement dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

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• Perfect information and potential games
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• Infinite Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Hausdorff Difference Hierarchy

Cited In (1)

• Title not available (Why is that?)

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