Acyclic Preferences and Existence of Sequential Nash Equilibria: A Formal and Constructive Equivalence

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-03359-9_21zbMath1252.91015OpenAlexW1530060568MaRDI QIDQ3183536

Stéphane Le Roux

Publication date: 20 October 2009

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03359-9_21

zbMATH Keywords

inductionabstractionCoqeffective generalisationsequential game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (6)

Proof mining with dependent types ⋮ A semi-potential for finite and infinite games in extensive form ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Recycling proof patterns in Coq: case studies ⋮ Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games

Uses Software

• Coq
• CoLoR

Cites Work

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• Interactive theorem proving and program development. Coq'Art: the calculus of inductive constructions. Foreword by Gérard Huet and Christine Paulin-Mohring.
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria
• On Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games
• Topological ordering of a list of randomly-numbered elements of a network
• Topological sorting of large networks

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