A further note on the stable matching problem

DOI10.1016/0166-218X(87)90059-XMaRDI QIDQ1082352zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange, David Gale, Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date 1987

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218x(87)90059-x

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscorematching gamestrong stability property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Recommendations

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• On classical and modern marriage problems
• The core of the matching game

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

(27)

• Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
• Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game
• Marriage matching and gender satisfaction
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• Unique stable matchings
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
• Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
• The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency

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