A further note on the stable matching problem

DOI10.1016/0166-218X(87)90059-XMaRDI QIDQ1082352zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange, David Gale, Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date 1987

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218x(87)90059-x

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscorematching gamestrong stability property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Review text

Using a lemma of J. S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of \textit{L. E. Dubins} and \textit{D. A. Freedman} [Am. Math. Mon. 88, 485-494 (1981; Zbl 0449.92024)]. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived.

Recommendations

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• On classical and modern marriage problems
• The core of the matching game

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

(28)

• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex
• Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
• Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488115 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
• Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
• Unique stable matchings
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
• Marriage matching and gender satisfaction
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor

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