A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111784MaRDI QIDQ6594331zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Camilo J. Sirguiado

Publication date 28 August 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymanipulationmatching markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
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Cites work

• A further note on the stable matching problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

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