A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
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Publication:6594331
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111784zbMATH Open1546.9118MaRDI QIDQ6594331FDOQ6594331
Authors: Camilo J. Sirguiado 
Publication date: 28 August 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
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