Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility

DOI10.3982/TE4137MaRDI QIDQ5164517zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4137

zbMATH Keywords

market designschool choicemanipulability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(11)

• Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
• Robustness to manipulations in school choice
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation
• Manipulability in school choice
• Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
• GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM
• Quantifying incentive (in)compatibility: a case study from sports
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• University competition and transnational education: the choice of branch campus
• School choice with preference rank classes
• College curriculum, diverging selectivity, and enrollment expansion

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