Robustness to manipulations in school choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01504-ZMaRDI QIDQ6570723zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Alexander S. Nesterov, Olga Rospuskova, Sofia Rubtcova

Publication date 10 July 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-023-01504-Z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Manipulability in school choice
• Robust stability in matching markets
• A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
• Group robust stability in matching markets

Cites work

• A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• Constrained school choice
• Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Manipulability in school choice
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust mechanism design of exchange
• The modified Boston mechanism

Cited in

(1)

• Coalitional manipulability in school choice

This page was built for publication: Robustness to manipulations in school choice

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6570723)