The modified Boston mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2018.08.004MaRDI QIDQ2334829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Umut Mert Dur

Publication date 8 November 2019

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

Boston mechanism modificationschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
• An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• Axioms for deferred acceptance
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• School choice: an experimental study
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Cited in

(24)

• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
• School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected?
• Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
• Manipulability in school choice
• Obvious manipulations
• Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
• Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
• When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
• Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
• Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
• A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
• Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
• Robustness to manipulations in school choice
• Non-bossiness
• Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
• Coalitional manipulability in school choice

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