The modified Boston mechanism
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Publication:2334829
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2018.08.004zbMATH Open1426.91174OpenAlexW2896932697MaRDI QIDQ2334829FDOQ2334829
Authors: Umut Mert Dur 
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.004
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Cites Work
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- School choice: an experimental study
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
Cited In (22)
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
- Manipulability in school choice
- Non-bossiness
- When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected?
- Obvious manipulations
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
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