When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.03.001MaRDI QIDQ459157zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yajing Chen

Publication date 8 October 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.03.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
• Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Group robust stability in matching markets
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Robust stability in matching markets

Cited in

(8)

• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Manipulability in school choice
• Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
• Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities

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