Manipulability in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105313MaRDI QIDQ2231403zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benoit Decerf, Martin Van der Linden

Publication date 29 September 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105313

zbMATH Keywords

Boston mechanismmanipulabilitydominant strategytie-breakingdeferred acceptance mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• School choice under partial fairness
• Self-selection in school choice
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• School choice: an experimental study
• Constrained school choice
• Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• Constrained school choice
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Obvious manipulations
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Self-selection in school choice
• Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
• What you don't know can help you in school assignment
• When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?

Cited in

(16)

• School Choice with Consent^*
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• Parallel markets in school choice
• Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
• Enrollment manipulations in school choice
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• Robustness to manipulations in school choice
• Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Level-k reasoning in school choice
• A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Self-selection in school choice
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
• Constrained school choice
• Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students

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