Recommendations
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
Cites work
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- Interjacency
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- Strategic Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
Cited in
(22)- Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
- Manipulability in school choice
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
- Decentralized Polling with Respectable Participants
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- On the safety of group manipulation
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
- Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules
- Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
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