Dictatorship versus manipulability
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Publication:2334835
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.07.001zbMATH Open1426.91103OpenAlexW2907268674WikidataQ127457635 ScholiaQ127457635MaRDI QIDQ2334835FDOQ2334835
Authors: Dezső Bednay, Anna Moskalenko, Attila Tasnádi 
Publication date: 8 November 2019
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/3845/1/cewp_201809.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?
Cited In (6)
- From decision problems to dethroned dictators
- Dictatorships, democracies and the people
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- Only a dictatorship is efficient
- A new informational base for social choice
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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