Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
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(45)- The manipulability index in the IANC model
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Manipulation of choice (agenda theory)
- Interjacency
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- Statistical evaluation of voting rules
- On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Network topology design to influence the effects of manipulative behaviors in a social choice procedure
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation
- Generalized manipulability of fuzzy social choice functions
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Manipulability of choice aggregations
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
- Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
- Manipulability of majoritarian procedures in two-dimensional Downsian model
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
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