Manipulability measures of common social choice functions

DOI10.1007/S003550050166zbMATH Open1066.91548OpenAlexW2026091573MaRDI QIDQ2386337FDOQ2386337

Authors: David A. Smith 

Publication date: 22 August 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050166

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (45)

• Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
• Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
• Voting procedures, complexity of
• The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
• On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
• Network topology design to influence the effects of manipulative behaviors in a social choice procedure
• Statistical evaluation of voting rules
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Manipulability of choice aggregations
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
• Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making
• On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
• The manipulability index in the IANC model
• Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
• Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
• Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
• Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Generalized manipulability of fuzzy social choice functions
• The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• Interjacency
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Manipulation of choice (agenda theory)
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• Manipulability of majoritarian procedures in two-dimensional Downsian model

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