Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
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Publication:2490939
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
- Dictatorial domains
- Social aggregators
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
Cited in
(7)- Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Yet another characterization of the majority rule
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