Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2005.07.002MaRDI QIDQ2490939zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 18 May 2006

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulemanipulationnon-reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
• Dictatorial domains
• Social aggregators
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences

Cited in

(7)

• Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
• Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Yet another characterization of the majority rule

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