Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
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Publication:2490939
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.07.002zbMath1125.91321OpenAlexW2061938275MaRDI QIDQ2490939
Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell
Publication date: 18 May 2006
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.07.002
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