Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.07.002zbMath1125.91321OpenAlexW2061938275MaRDI QIDQ2490939

Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 18 May 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulemanipulationnon-reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain ⋮ Yet another characterization of the majority rule ⋮ Strategy-proofness and weighted voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
• Dictatorial domains
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Social aggregators
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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