Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2005.07.002zbMATH Open1125.91321OpenAlexW2061938275MaRDI QIDQ2490939FDOQ2490939

Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 

Publication date: 18 May 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.07.002

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zbMATH Keywords

majority rulemanipulationnon-reversal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social aggregators
• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Dictatorial domains
• Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Cited In (7)

• Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
• Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy
• Strategy-proofness and weighted voting
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Yet another characterization of the majority rule

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