Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5940810
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00362-1zbMath1005.91085WikidataQ56212386 ScholiaQ56212386MaRDI QIDQ5940810
No author found.
Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B99: Mathematical economics
Related Items
A unifying impossibility theorem, Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks, The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited, Tops-only domains, Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness, Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Circular domains, Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach, Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes, Impossibility theorems are modified and unified, Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof, Dictatorship on top-circular domains, Random dictatorship domains, A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice, Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation, Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
