Dictatorial domains
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Publication:1407770
DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8zbMath1069.91026OpenAlexW4245937112MaRDI QIDQ1407770
Shurojit Chatterji, Navin Aswal, Arunava Sen
Publication date: 21 September 2003
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8
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