Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
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Publication:6156326
DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00281-4zbMath1518.91039MaRDI QIDQ6156326
Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2595
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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