Mechanism design by observant and informed planners

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00281-4zbMATH Open1518.91039MaRDI QIDQ6156326FDOQ6156326

Authors: Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen 

Publication date: 13 June 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2595

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zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessunanimitylocal strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Dictatorial domains
• Implementation and Renegotiation

Cited In (4)

• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
• Mechanism design with information acquisition

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