Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
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Recommendations
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- Game theory and mechanism design
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
- Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094
Cites work
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation with Near-Complete Information
- Implementation with partial provability
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
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