Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1650274
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.002zbMath1396.91142OpenAlexW2750711473MaRDI QIDQ1650274
Nicolás Figueroa, Juan Dubra, Marcelo Caffera
Publication date: 3 July 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75721/1/MPRA_paper_75721.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)
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