Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
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Publication:2437181
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.011zbMATH Open1284.91182OpenAlexW2108022909MaRDI QIDQ2437181FDOQ2437181
Olivier Tercieux, Navin Kartik, Richard T. Holden
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
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Cites Work
- Admissibility in Games
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Exact implementation
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- Implementation with evidence
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
- Role of honesty in full implementation
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- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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- Continuous implementation
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- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
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- Implementation with partial provability
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementation with Near-Complete Information
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
Cited In (30)
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Lying for votes
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Honesty through repeated interactions
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs
- Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Information disclosure with many alternatives
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
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