Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
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Publication:2437181
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011zbMath1284.91182OpenAlexW2108022909MaRDI QIDQ2437181
Olivier Tercieux, Navin Kartik, Richard T. Holden
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
Related Items (26)
Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents ⋮ Promises and endogenous reneging costs ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Reaching consensus through approval bargaining ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Information disclosure with many alternatives ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ Epistemological implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
Cites Work
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