Implementation with partial provability
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Publication:449172
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.017zbMATH Open1247.91054OpenAlexW2134750299MaRDI QIDQ449172FDOQ449172
Authors: Elchanan Ben-Porath, Barton L. Lipman 
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.017
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Implementation with evidence
- Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Implementation with partial provability
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Implementation with Near-Complete Information
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Implementation with partial verification
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