Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- A course in game theory.
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Bayesian Implementation
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
- Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
- Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation with partial provability
- Long persuasion games
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
- The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(23)- Implementation with evidence
- Sub-core solutions of the problem of strong implementation
- Evidence reading mechanisms
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Implementation with partial verification
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Implementation with partial provability
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Implementation with Near-Complete Information
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
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