Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Acceptable points in games of perfect information
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Beyond nash equilibrium
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Distributed computing meets game theory
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Implementation with partial provability
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation with a private good
- Nash implementation with little communication
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Strategy space reduction for feasible implementation of Walrasian performance
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(7)- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
- Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios
- Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
- Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
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