Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.05.010zbMATH Open1208.91044OpenAlexW3126103900MaRDI QIDQ632976FDOQ632976

Authors: Ludovic Renou, Karl H. Schlag 

Publication date: 28 March 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/8067

Recommendations

• Rationalizable implementation
• General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Epsilon-Nash implementation
• Implementation without rationality assumptions

zbMATH Keywords

implementationminimax regretMaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Regret aversion and opportunity dependence
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

Cited In (7)

• Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
• Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
• Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
• Regret-minimizing project choice
• Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games

This page was built for publication: Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q632976)