To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.10.004MaRDI QIDQ380910zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Publication date 14 November 2013

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/41465164/wp11_11.pdf, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001522?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityimplementationmechanismsquantal response equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(11)

• Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
• Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) coordination games
• Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior
• Safe implementation
• Grounded predictions of teamwork as a one-shot game: a multiagent multi-armed bandits approach

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