Fault Tolerant Implementation
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- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Fault tolerant mechanism design
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Computational aspects of uncertainty profiles and angel-daemon games
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1693454 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mechanism design and intentions
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Fault reporting in partially known networks and folk theorems
- On the Complexity of Equilibria Problems in Angel-Daemon Games
- To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47521 (Why is no real title available?)
- Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Implementation theory
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Irrationality-proofness: markets versus games
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Beyond dominance and Nash: ranking equilibria by critical mass
- Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality
- Incentive-based fault-tolerant cooperative payoff design in weakly acyclic games
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Viable Nash equilibria: an experiment
- Attaining equilibria using control sets
- Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Safe implementation
- Full surplus extraction and consideration sets
- Attaining equilibria using control sets
- Strategy-proof mechanism design with boundedly rational agents: theory and experiment
- Anonymous implementation
- Balancing rationality and social influence: alpha-rational Nash equilibrium in games with herding
- Congestion games with malicious players
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting
- Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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