Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103196MaRDI QIDQ6868443zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Anand Chopra, Malachy James Gavan, Antonio Penta

Publication date 26 January 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103196

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanism designmixed implementationrobustnesssafe implementationset-comonotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites work

• A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
• Constrained implementation
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
• Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
• Voluntary implementation

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